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Abstract 
Collective bargaining in Germany takes place either at the industry level or at the firm level; 
collective bargaining coverage is much higher than union density; and not all employees in a 
covered firm are necessarily covered. This institutional setup suggests to distinguish explicitly 
union power as measured by net union density (NUD) in a labor market segment, coverage at the 
firm level, and coverage at the individual level. Using linked employer-employee data and 
applying quantile regressions, this is the first empirical paper which simultaneously analyzes 
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share of employees in a firm covered by industry-wide or firm-level contracts is associated with 
higher wages. Yet, individual bargaining coverage in a covered firm shows a negative impact 
both on the wage level and on wage dispersion. A higher union density is negative at all points in 
the wage distribution for uncovered employees. In line with an insurance motive, higher union 
density compresses the wage structure and, at the same time, it is associated with a uniform 
leftward movement of the distribution for uncovered employees. 
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1 Introduction
The impact of institutions on economic performance in general, and on wage setting in
the labor market in particular, has been under debate for a while (OECD 2006). In times
of increasingly heterogeneous economic conditions, it is often argued that institutional
rigidities restrain labor market performance and the dynamics of economic development.
The discussion often refers to the impact of trade unions, see e. g. the handbook Addison
and Schnabel (2003).
The main channel for unions to influence the wage structure is through collective bar-
gaining. In Germany, this influence goes beyond mere negotiation of wage premia for
union members since collective agreements on individual membership premia are forbid-
den by constitutional law. Given the high rate of collective bargaining coverage in the
German labor market, union-bargained wages apply to the larger part of all employees
and unions influence the wage structure of members as well as of non-members. The de-
sign of the German wage-setting system thus offers the possibility to explicitly distinguish
between the effects of union density and collective bargaining coverage. We argue that,
on the one hand, net union density as a proxy for union power influences the union’s
threat point in the collective bargaining process and therefore influences the bargaining
outcome. Collective bargaining coverage, on the other hand, captures the actual appli-
cation of bargained agreements. So density and coverage offer a pre-bargaining and a
post-bargaining indicator for unions’ influence in the labor market.
The empirical literature on the impact of unions on the German wage structure has
so far been confined to using either collective bargaining coverage (e.g. Stephan and
Gerlach (2003, 2005)) or union membership (Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005)). The stud-
ies on coverage distinguish between firm–level and industry–wide collective agreements
but do not distinguish between firm–level and individual-level coverage by these agree-
ments. Our study extends upon this literature in several dimensions. First, we use a
newly available linked employer–employee data set, the German Structure of Earnings
Survey (GSES, Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung) 2001, which is unique in the sense
that it provides not only firm–level information on collective wage bargaining, but also
the coverage status of the individual employees. So not only can we distinguish between
different levels of collective bargaining, but also between firm–level and individual-level
effects. Second, as there is no information on union membership in the GSES, we impute
net union densities for homogeneously defined labor market segments from GSOEP-based
estimations of Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Wang (2006). This enables us to simultaneously
analyze the effects of union density and collective bargaining coverage. Third, we employ
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OLS as well as quantile regressions in order to estimate impacts on wage levels and on
wage dispersion.
From a methodological point of view the analysis involves the estimation of the asymp-
totic distribution of a weighted quantile regression estimator accounting for clustering, as
the estimations contain regressors from different levels of aggregation (Angrist, Cher-
nozhukov, and Ferna´ndez-Val 2006, see).
While confirming the need to employ firm–level as well as individual-level data, our
results show a positive effect of a firm’s decision to apply industry–wide or firm–level
contracts on the level of wages. Given the share of covered employees in a firm, however,
uncovered employees with individual contracts ceteris paribus earn higher wages. Col-
lective bargaining coverage is found to reduce wage inequality. A higher union density
reinforces the positive wage effects of coverage. A surprising result is that given coverage
status, the effects of net union density on the wage level and on wage dispersion are neg-
ative. While striving for more wage equality along the entire wage distribution, powerful
unions may even make concessions regarding the average wage level. Furthermore, an in-
crease in wages for covered employees due to union influence may result in a larger labor
supply in the uncovered sector, thus resulting in downward wage pressure there. This ef-
fect seems to dominate a possible positive union threat effect which may have caused firms
in the uncovered sector to also pay higher wages in order to prevent coverage. Overall, our
findings on the impact of union density on wage dispersion are in line with an insurance
motive of union representation (Agell and Lommerud 1992, Burda 1995). However, the
uniform decline of wages in the uncovered sector across the entire wage distribution in
response to an increase in union density requires some further explanation. This finding
may be due to a decline of investment when union density increases (Vogel 2007) or to
downward pressure on wages because of the increase in labor supply in the uncovered
sector brought about by the higher wages in the covered sector.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches constituent
elements of the German system of collective wage bargaining. Section 3 briefly reviews
the related literature on the nature of union wage effects and summarizes existing evidence
on the effects of union density and collective bargaining coverage on the German wage
structure. Our econometric investigation is presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Collective Wage Bargaining in Germany
In Germany, there exist three fundamental regimes of wage bargaining. First, collective
bargaining takes place at the industry level between a union and an employers’ associa-
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tion. Second, a union can negotiate with single firms to sign firm–level collective contracts.
Third, employers and employees may also negotiate individual contracts. According to
the German Collective Bargaining Act (Tarifvertragsgesetz ), collectively negotiated agree-
ments are necessarily binding for individual job matches only if the firm is a member of
an employer association and, in addition, the worker is a union member.
In fact, the scope of collective agreements goes beyond the organized parties. Wages
set at the firm level as well as individually bargained wages are adapted towards collective
bargaining agreements, be it in order to reduce transaction costs or not to create incentives
for employees to join a union. Collective agreements can also be declared generally binding
by the Minister for Labor and Social Affaires.1 In light of the traditionally high coverage,
researchers in the past (e.g. Fitzenberger (1999, chapter 6)) often assumed that collective
bargaining agreements apply to all employees.
Collective agreements constituting discriminatory wage policies with disadvantages for
non-union members are forbidden by constitutional law (negative freedom of association,
negative Koalitionsfreiheit, Grundgesetz Art. 9 ). As wage gains from union membership
are not internalized, there exists a free-rider problem of missing individual incentives to
join a union.2 As a result, union density is considerably smaller than collective bargaining
coverage. The design of the German wage-setting system thus suggests to distinguish ex-
plicitly between the effects (i) of different bargaining regimes, (ii) of bargaining coverage
both at the individual and at the firm level, and (iii) of union density in a labor market
segment. However, in light of the free-rider problem and of the fact that collective agree-
ments can not discriminate between members and nonmembers, it is not meaningful to
estimate a wage premium for individual membership, as done in most studies for the UK
or the US (Lewis 1986, Card, Lemieux, and Riddell 2003).
2.1 Union Membership and Union Density
Union membership, which had merely shown some variation with the business cycle in
former decades, has been declining steadily during more recent decades (Ebbinghaus
(2003); Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Wang (2006)). The early 1980’s mark the beginning of
a pronounced trend towards deunionization: having started out at a gross union density
1The direct impact of this provision used to be of minor relevance—in the year 2003, only 0.8% of
all employees subject to social security contributions were covered by agreements which were binding by
declaration (BMWA 2004). Yet, the mere possibility of such a declaration constitutes incentives per se;
see OECD (1994).
2However, there are additional motives for union membership. The literature discusses selective incen-
tives provided in addition to public goods (Olson 1965), collective-voice mechanisms (Hirschmann 1970),
or the existence of social norms (Akerlof 1980, Booth 1985).
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(GUD, defined as the ratio of union members to the number of employees in the labor
market) of about 40%, GUD was down to a historically low level of 27% by the year 2004.
Deunionization was interrupted by a unification effect in 1990, when West German unions
were very successful in recruiting members in unified Germany. However, the upsurge in
aggregate GUD was not sustainable, and deunionization continued even more rapidly in
the 1990’s and 2000’s. Some trade unions have responded to the decline in size by merging
(Keller (2005)). However, unions have not been able to reverse the trend (Ebbinghaus
(2003); Fichter (1997)).
Union density governs a union’s threat point in the collective bargaining process and
is therefore pivotal to the bargaining outcome. Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005) argue
that net union density, i. e., the share of employed union members among the number
of employees, is an appropriate measure for union power. The higher the number of
union members paying membership fees, the higher is the union’s funding. In case of
industrial conflicts, higher financial power enables the union to pay strike benefits for
a longer period of time. Financial power and union representation at the shop floor
increase individual support for union action, the probability and the length of a strike,
and therefore the expected damage inflicted upon employers. Furthermore, financially
powerful unions can invest more in public relations in order to sanitize their public image.
Yet, financial obligations also increase with the size of the union. Relative financial
power is thus mirrored best by the share of contributors among potentially represented
workers. Moreover, as union growth comes along with increased heterogeneity within
the union, conflicting interests and contradictory statements increasingly undermine the
union’s representative role; see also Ebbinghaus (2003) and Keller (2005). Thus net union
density is preferable as compared to both gross union density and the absolute number
of union members.
Net union density (NUD) for homogenously defined labor market segments can not be
inferred from union records and thus has to be estimated. A number of studies estimates
individual determinants of union membership based on survey data.3 Estimated mem-
bership propensities can then be used to project NUD. Aggregate NUD usually falls short
of GUD by about 10 percentage points. Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Wang (2006) report
that after German unification, membership in East Germany started out at a higher level
than in West Germany but exhibited a stronger decline afterwards. Aggregate NUD for
the years 1993 and 2003 were 38% and 19% in East Germany, and 27% and 21% in West
3Lorenz and Wagner (1991), Fitzenberger, Haggeney, and Ernst (1999), Schnabel and Wagner (2003,
2005, 2007), Beck and Fitzenberger (2004), Goerke and Pannenberg (2004), Fitzenberger, Kohn, and
Wang (2006).
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Germany.
2.2 Collective Bargaining Coverage
Employees are paid according to individual contracts between the employee and the firm
or according to a collective agreement. A collective agreement can be negotiated between
a union and an employers’ association, a union and a firm, or a works council and a
firm. Arrangements between firm and works council are only allowed to govern wages
or salaries if the firm is not subject to a collective contract or if the collective contract
explicitly allows for this type of arrangement. Firm-level agreements involving a union
are allowed to set wages even if a collective agreement exists, as long as the firm–level
agreement is more specific than the collective agreement. Collective contracts may also
contain opening clauses explicitly allowing deviations from the terms of the contract under
particular circumstances.
Collectively negotiated agreements are compulsory only for a minority of job matches.
In all other cases, the adoption of a collective contract is the result of two voluntary
decisions. First, the firm decides whether to subject itself to collective agreements at all.
In the interpretation of Dustmann and Scho¨nberg (2004), firms use collective contracts
as a commitment device. At a second stage, the firm and each individual employee
agree on whether a collective agreement be applied for individual matches. At this latter
stage, different groups of employees are expected to be selected out of collective coverage.
On the one hand, high-skilled employees in upper professional status categories such as
managers are paid highest wages without reference to a collective agreement. On the
other hand, workers with marginal employment contracts and low-skilled employees may
not be covered by collective agreements and be paid below the collective level applying for
core-group coworkers. As a result, the share of covered workers within a firm is usually
below one.
Collective bargaining coverage, as measured by the share of employment contracts
following collective agreements, was relatively stable in West Germany until the end of
the 1990’s but has been declining since. By the year 2003, 45% (70%) of West German
firms (employees) were covered by a collective agreement (Schnabel 2005). With 26%
(47%) the corresponding coverage in East Germany was considerably lower. The ‘erosion’
towards more decentralized wage setting is examined by a group of studies using firm–level
data,4 and it is reconfirmed by survey evidence from works councils discussed in Bispinck
and Schulten (2003).
4Kohaut and Bellmann (1997), Bellmann, Kohaut, and Schnabel (1999), Kohaut and Schnabel (2003b,
2003a).
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3 Union Wage Effects in the Literature
Bargaining models treat the negotiation of wages as a rent-sharing problem, the solution
to which depends upon the bargaining power of the negotiating parties. In classical
models unions enforce a high wage level for the represented work force. Models such
as monopoly unions, right-to-manage models, or efficient bargaining predict a monotonic
positive relationship between union power and the level of bargained wages (Farber (1986);
Oswald (1985); Naylor (2003)).
Some more recent studies also incorporate effects on higher moments of the wage
distribution. Agell and Lommerud (1992) and Burda (1995) focus on wage dispersion
and discuss an insurance motive for union membership. Faced with uncertainty of future
productivity or wages, risk averse employees a priori have a taste for wage compression.
If the income of employees depends upon different states of nature such as demand shocks
on the firm’s product market (Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi 2005), a union acts as
agent of the work force and bargains for a compression of the wage distribution relative
to the productivity distribution.5 The compression effect is also consistent with search
and matching theories (Mortensen and Pissarides 1999). By enforcing ‘equal pay for
equal work’ a union additionally seeks to limit favoritism and discrimination by superiors
and colleagues, and to encourage solidarity among the work force; see Freeman (1982).6
Ceteris paribus, the degree of wage compression is the higher, the higher the bargaining
power of the union.
Yet, risk-reducing insurance or equity considerations come at the price of an insurance
premium or discount. If a union has a strong preference for wage equality and also wants
to prevent negative employment effects, this effect can overcompensate the union’s strive
for a higher wage level such that a higher net union density is accompanied by a lower
wage level. A priori, the sign of the overall level effect is ambiguous as there is a trade-off
between reduced inequality and a higher wage level (Calmfors 1993).
Collective agreements do not constrain a firm’s right to pay premia above the wage set
in the collective contract. So actual wages may differ substantially from the contractual
wage. This aspect is examined by the wage-drift literature and studies related to nominal,
notional, or real wage rigidity; see, e. g., Bauer, Bonin, and Sunde (2003) and Pfeiffer
(2003). Cardoso and Portugal (2005) analyze the gap between contractual and actual
5The reallocation implied by a compressed wage structure can be understood as a substitute for explicit
means of redistribution such as taxation; see Agell (1999, 2002).
6Though the “equal pay for equal work” campaign originally focused on equal pay for female employees,
it has become a commonplace for all anti-discriminatory policies.
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wages for employees covered by different types of collective agreements in Portugal.7
They find that the positive effect of union strength—as measured by the share of covered
employees—on the level of contractual wages is partly offset by a smaller wage cushion.
So higher contractual wages in sectors with a high share of covered employees do not lead
to higher actual wages. Besides, firms covered by (multi- or single-) firm–level agreements
pay higher wages than firms covered by industry–wide agreements.
At any rate, the impact of unions on the wage structure likely varies across the wage
distribution. If collectively bargained wages serve as wage floors, the (conditional) wage
distribution is compressed from below. In the wage bargaining model of Bu¨ttner and
Fitzenberger (2003), for example, efficiency wages are paid in the upper part of a pro-
ductivity distribution, whereas union-bargained wages above marginal productivity are
binding for less productive matches. This is in line with the perception of a union rep-
resenting mainly less productive employees and striving for higher wages particularly at
the lower end of the distribution. Then compression of the wage distribution from below
is the higher, the stronger the influence of the union.
3.1 Effects of Membership or Coverage?
The question whether union effects should be attributed to union membership or union
recognition, has been discussed in the international literature for some time. Traditionally,
union membership on the one hand and union recognition or collective bargaining coverage
on the other hand were essentially taken as mere alternative measures; see Lewis’ (1986)
survey for the US. Differences were regarded as relatively unimportant, in particular for
States without right-to-work law. Some more recent studies focus on the question whether
coverage and membership have conceptually different impacts, such that there may be
a coverage premium as well as a membership premium. Blakemore, Hunt, and Kiker
(1986) and Hunt, Kiker, and Williams (1987) argue that a coverage effect at the firm level
reflects monopoly power of the negotiating union, whereas individual membership effects
stem from socialization in unions as institutions.
Andrews, Stewart, Swaffield, and Upward (1998) review and replicate different ap-
proaches to disentangle union wage differentials in the British context, where union mem-
bers as well as non-members can work in establishments with union recognition. Stud-
ies for the UK thus distinguish between three main groups of individual statuses: cov-
ered members, covered non-members, and non-covered non-members. Andrews, Stewart,
Swaffield, and Upward (1998) conclude that the estimates of membership and coverage
7Cardoso and Portugal (2005) refer to this gap as “wage cushion” (p. 877) in order to distinguish it
from the notion of wage drift, which traditionally focusses on the change of the gap.
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premia are rather sensitive with respect to the chosen specification. By and large, the
membership differential should dominate the effects of coverage. However, using a similar
modeling framework, but applying panel data estimation technique in order to account for
possible endogeneity of union status, Koevoets (2007) finds no evidence for a membership
premium nor for a coverage premium in individual wages.
A few studies stress the importance of aggregate union power. Freeman and Medoff
(1981) find that the share of organized employees at the industry or State level positively
influences individual wages. The share is implemented as either the percentage covered
by collective bargaining (in manufacturing) or net union density (in construction). The
difference is basically driven by data availability and there is no discussion of conceptual
differences. In Schumacher’s (1999) analysis the share of free-riders erodes union power
and results in lower wages.
Stewart (1987) reckons that wage premia for closed shop regulations as extreme cases of
union membership premia may differ depending on the institutional settings in which the
bargaining takes place. More generally, the effects of different bargaining regimes are likely
to interfere with other country-specific institutions and social norms (Flanagan 1999).
For example, Card and de la Rica (2006) find that firm–level contracting in Spain results
in higher wages as compared to regional and national contracts, while Hartog, Leuven,
and Teulings (2002) report only minor differences between bargaining regimes in the
Netherlands as a corporatist country. Analyzing union effects in Italy, Dell’Aringa and
Lucifora (1994) find a positive effect of recognition in particular for local bargaining
coverage, but also a negative ceteris paribus effect for plant-level union density.
Based on our reading of the international empirical literature, three important aspects
concerning a differential impact of coverage and membership are ignored. First, the
recent literature focuses on union membership and ignores union density in relevant labor
market segments. Most papers estimating a differential effect of coverage and membership
(Andrews, Stewart, Swaffield, and Upward (1998); Koevoets (2007)) do not allow for a
wage effect of membership for uncovered workers. Second, the traditional notion of the
‘union threat effect’ suggests spillover effects from union activity to non-unionized workers.
Firms may pay higher wages to non-unionized workers in order to prevent unionization.
In the German context, this suggests that wages should increase with union density also
for uncovered workers because the threat of unionization for uncovered firms increases
with union density. Third, traditional labor supply spillover effects from the covered
to the uncovered sector suggest an opposite spillover effect on wages. If the positive
wage effect of coverage increases with union density because higher union density reflects
higher bargaining power of the union, then the resulting higher wage will cause lower
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employment of certain-type workers in the covered sector of a labor market segment and
a higher supply of such workers in the uncovered sector. This higher labor supply may
cause a downward pressure of wages in the uncovered sector, thus resulting in a negative
relationship between union density and wages in the uncovered sector. Along a similar
line, a negative effect of union density on wages in the uncovered sector may result from
firms’ investment behavior. In segments with strong unions, both covered and uncovered
firms may ceteris paribus invest less into capital, which in turn would reduce workers’
productivity and thus wages in covered as well as in uncovered firms (Vogel 2007).
Concluding, the available studies in the international empirical literature are intrin-
sically linked to the institutional settings for the country analyzed and rely heavily on
the availability of adequate data on union status. Due to institutional differences, results
from studies for the US or the UK on the differential effects of coverage and membership
are unlikely to be of relevance for the German case. We argue in particular that for Ger-
many one should investigate the effect of union density in the market for a specific type
of labor as a proxy for union power, that it is meaningless to investigate wage effects of
individual membership,8 and that it is useful to analyze also the effect of union density
in the uncovered sector. The following paragraphs survey the existing literature for Ger-
many which either studies the effects of union density or the effects of bargaining coverage
separately. No paper exists so far which analyzes the wage effects of union density and
coverage simultaneously.
3.2 Union Density and the German Wage Structure
There exists only a sparse literature estimating the effects of union density on wages in
Germany. Using the union membership projections from Beck and Fitzenberger (2004),
which are averaged within labor market cells, Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005) estimate
the link between union power—as measured by net union density—and measures of the
wage structure within and between labor market cells spanned by the dimensions year
of observation, industry, skill-level, and age of the employees. A higher union density is
ceteris paribus associated with lower within and between-cell wage dispersion as well as
with a lower wage level. The results thus corroborate the insurance argument. In line
with a minimum wage interpretation of union-bargained wages, the wage distribution is
compressed disproportionately from below.
Using similar measures for union density, Bu¨ttner and Fitzenberger (1998) analyze
the impact of union density on wages when estimating quantile regressions for a regional
8This point is also supported by individual-level regressions in Goerke and Pannenberg (2004), who
find no significant effect of individual union membership on wages.
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wage curve. The study uses local unemployment rates and aggregate unemployment rates
in order to distinguish the impact of centralized bargaining and local influences on wages.
The results show that a higher union density reduces the wage dispersion. Fitzenberger
(1999, chapter 6) estimates a structural model of industry–wide wage bargaining based
on a union maximizing a Stone-Geary utility function. The study distinguishes two skill-
types of labor and union density is allowed to affect the parameters of the utility function.
The results show that, in manufacturing, an increase in union density is associated with a
significantly stronger preference for high employment relative to wage levels and relative
to a reduction of wage dispersion.
3.3 Bargaining Coverage and the German Wage Structure
If wage policies set in collective agreements reflect unions’ objectives, the decisions of
firms and individuals to adopt a collective agreement have two effects. First, differences
between covered and non-covered segments would increase as the result of the unions’
strive for higher wages. Second, wage compression induced through the collective contract
would reduce within-segment inequality. The question which effect would prevail has
been discussed for some time in the Anglo-Saxon context; see Card, Lemieux, and Riddell
(2003). Related literature for Germany again is still sparse.
Dustmann and Scho¨nberg’s (2004) analysis reveals that firms applying collective con-
tracts as a commitment device ceteris paribus employ a higher share of workers with
an apprenticeship degree. Moreover, the employed linked data of the IAB employment
statistics and the IAB establishment panel suggest that under collective coverage, em-
ployee turnover is higher, wage cuts occur more often, and (conditional) wages have a
lower variance.
A couple of studies analyze subsamples of the German Structure of Earnings Survey
(GSES, Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung). Using different cross sections (1990, 1995,
2001) of the subsample for Lower-Saxony, Gerlach and Stephan (2002, 2006a, 2006c) re-
port Kernel density estimates of log wage distributions for labor market regimes with
and without collective and firm–level wage agreements and estimate firm–level wage re-
gressions. In the manufacturing sector, average hourly wages paid in accordance with a
collective or a firm–level agreement are higher than the average of individually negoti-
ated wages. Yet, unconditional as well as conditional wage dispersion is highest among
individual contracts. Differences between regimes increased between the years 1990 and
2001. Similar results are obtained by Bechtel, Mo¨dinger, and Strotmann (2004) based on
the GSES subsample for Baden-Wu¨rttemberg. Multi-level regression models in Stephan
and Gerlach (2003, 2005) reveal that differences in individual wages are consistent with a
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higher base wage in case of collective coverage. Returns to human capital—skill, experi-
ence, and tenure—as well as residual wage dispersion are lower under collective coverage.
Gerlach and Stephan (2006b) note that collective agreements compress within-firm com-
pensation schemes across occupations. As Heinbach and Spindler’s (2007) analysis of
the GSES waves 1995 and 2001 for West Germany shows, wage premia in firms apply-
ing collective contracts are the smaller the higher the position in the (unconditional)
wage distribution. Their quantile decomposition analysis in the tradition of Machado and
Mata (2005) and Melly (2006) reveals that observed differences across the distribution
are mainly due to different bargaining (coefficient) effects as opposed to selection effects
(differences in characteristics).
In a companion paper also using the GSES 2001, Kohn and Lembcke (2007) analyze
wage distributions for various labor market subgroups by means of kernel density estima-
tion, variance decompositions, and individual and firm–level wage regressions. The thrust
of findings confirms a priori expectations. Union impact through collective bargaining re-
sults in a higher wage level as well as reduced overall and residual wage dispersion. Yet,
there is no clear evidence for disproportionate wage compression from below or a wage
floor formed by collectively bargained low wage brackets. Moreover, the impacts are
considerably heterogeneous across different labor market groups.
Heinbach (2006) merges the GSES subsample for Baden-Wu¨rttemberg with informa-
tion on the existence of an opening clause in collective agreements. When distinguishing
between collective agreements with and those without opening clauses in firm–level re-
gressions, he finds that mean wages for blue-collar workers in manufacturing are lower
under opening clauses, but no significant wage differences exist for white-collar workers.
Moreover, no significant differences exist regarding wage dispersion as measured by the
standard deviation of wages.
Gu¨rtzgen (2006) uses a longitudinal data set linking the IAB employment statistics and
the IAB establishment panel (LIAB), which provides firm–level information on coverage.
She concludes that selection effects are responsible for larger parts of observed premia
associated with industry and firm–level contracting. Yet, once selection is accounted for,
positive premia for industry–wide contracts in West Germany and for firm–level contracts
in East Germany remain. The effect of collective bargaining coverage on the returns to
observable attributes turns out negligible in her study.
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4 Econometric Investigation
The evidence surveyed in the previous section suggests that both coverage by collective
bargaining and a higher union density are associated with lower wage dispersion. Cover-
age is also associated with higher wage levels while the link between union density and
the wage level is ambiguous. The effects of sector-wide collective agreements on wage
dispersion seems to be stronger than the effect of firm–level agreements. The literature so
far does not distinguish between individual coverage and firm–level coverage and results
in the literature on coverage are based on firm–level coverage only. Also, there are no
results in the literature regarding the joint impact of coverage and union density on wages.
Our paper is the first analysis which distinguishes between the following types of union
wage effects in Germany: (i) union density, (ii) coverage by a firm–level collective agree-
ment versus coverage by sector-wide collective agreements, and (iii) firm–level coverage
versus individual coverage. We use a unique data set which allows to distinguish both (ii)
and (iii) and we use membership projections from Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Wang (2006)
to impute union density to our data set. We carefully analyze the interaction effects
between the different measures.
We restrict our analysis to West Germany for two reasons. First, union policy in
East Germany is strongly aligned to an adaption of West German standards. So wage
policies are not set independently but with regard to West German wages. Second, in
case of industrial conflicts, union action in East Germany relies on solidarity from West
German unions. It is therefore not reasonable to assume that East German unions set
their objectives independently.9
4.1 Data
Our study is based on the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES, Gehalts- und
Lohnstrukturerhebung) 2001, a cross-sectional linked employer–employee data set contain-
ing about 850,000 employees in some 22,000 firms. While missing essentially the public
sector, the GSES covers the major part of industry and private services. There are several
advantages to using the GSES 2001. It is one of the largest mandatory surveys available
for Germany. The sample not only includes workers in regular employment, but also
9When the metal working union IG Metall went on strike for the equalization of West and East
German hours of work in the year 2003, the union had to rely on “strike tourists” from West Germany to
fill their ranks. This was deemed “common practice” by union representatives (DIE WELT, 06/23/2003).
However, by the time the strike affected West German firms, the solidarity of West German employee
representatives declined rapidly, and the strike was finally broken off.
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employees in vocational training, marginal employment, or partial retirement schemes.
In contrast to earlier GSES waves and to the IAB linked employer–employee data set
(LIAB), wages are neither truncated nor censored so that lower and upper parts of the
wage distribution can be analyzed precisely. The data are gathered from firms’ official
reporting obligations. Therefore, they are more reliable than information from individual-
level surveys or data not covered by duties of disclosure (Jacobebbinghaus 2002). Most
importantly for our investigation, the GSES provides not only firm–level information on
bargaining coverage, but the coverage status for each individual worker.
The GSES 2001 has only recently been made available for research. So far, analyses
with GSES data have been restricted to administrative use or to regional subsamples (cf.
Fitzenberger and Reize (2002, 2003) and the studies cited in section 3.3). For descriptions
of the data set see Hafner (2005) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2000, 2004). We use the
on-site-use version of the GSES available in the Research Data Center of the Federal
Statistical Office in Wiesbaden. Details on the selection of the data cemployed in this
study are provided in appendix A. We focus on prime-age male employees working full-
time and analyze hourly wages for both blue-collar and white-collar workers.10 Definitions
of variables used and summary statistics are displayed in table 1.
Since the GSES does not provide information on union membership, we extend the
GSES by imputing individual propensities for union membership from Fitzenberger,
Kohn, and Wang (2006), who estimate determinants of union membership using sur-
vey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for East and West Germany.
Net union density (NUD), our measure for union power, is then obtained by means of
aggregation at a cell level spanned by the dimensions region (7 states) × industry (30 sec-
tors) × skill (4 groups defined by educational attainment) × age (711 five-year brackets),
yielding a total of 5,841 nonempty cells.
The cell definition is advantageous because it reflects the structure of the German
wage bargaining system. The regional dimension and the sector classification account for
the fact that collective negotiations take place at the industry level in different bargaining
regions (Tarifbezirke). The observation that collective agreements further differentiate
between various wage groups is captured by the dimensions skill and age. The cell-level
aggregation enables us to analyze the effect of union power independent of individual
membership. As pointed out above, it would make no sense to estimate individual mem-
bership premia.
10Our analysis combines blue-collar and white-collar workers as unions are assumed to follow one
cohesive policy for all represented workers.
11The last bracket consist only of 55 year old employees.
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4.2 Descriptive Evidence
We focus on the core labor market group of male employees (both blue and white-collar) in
West Germany (excluding Berlin) and distinguish the following three regimes of bargaining
coverage:
(CC) collective contract negotiated between an employers’ association and a union.
(FC) firm–level agreement negotiated between a firm and a union or a works council.
(IC) individual contract negotiated between employee and employer.
The first column of table 2 displays the size of the respective regimes in our GSES sample.
The numbers are broadly in line with those in the literature cited above. 57% of West
German employees are paid according to a collective contract. With another 8% covered
by a firm–level agreement, this leaves about a third of the work force with individual
contracts.
Turning to the share of covered employees within firms, figure 1 reveals a bimodal
distribution. About 40% of all employees work in firms which do not apply any collective
or firm–level agreements at all. Another 7% of employees work in firms with full coverage.
This leaves more than one half of all employees in firms with partial coverage which enable
us to distinguish between individual and firm–level effects. Among the latter group, firms
with relatively high coverage rates dominate.12
Table 3 reports summary statistics for cell-level net union density NUD. Whereas
the first row reports raw numbers for the cells, the second row provides an employment-
weighted measure by summarizing at the individual level.13 With respective average NUD
of 19 and 23%, net union density is markedly lower than collective bargaining coverage.
Again, the numbers match those in the literature.
Columns two to five in table 2 summarize log hourly wages by wage–setting regimes.
On average, employees with individual contracts earn the lowest wages (2.786). Wages
paid according to a collective agreement are markedly higher (2.810), and the highest
wages are paid by firms subject to a firm–level agreement (2.833). Wage dispersion
as measured by the standard deviation of log hourly wages is lowest among employees
12Note that our analysis does exclude white-collar workers in the highest professional status category
who would reasonably be expected to pursue management objectives and who would be paid without
reference to collective wage setting.
13Note first that the cell dimensions define NUD at a relatively aggregate level. However, NUD is not
identical for all employees in a firm. Note second that the statistics at the individual level in table 3 do
not summarize imputed individual propensities for union membership, but the assigned cell-level union
density.
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under collective coverage (0.286) and only slightly higher in case of firm–level contracts
(0.314). Employees with individually negotiated wages face a remarkably higher variation
(0.420).14
The descriptive evidence is thus consistent with the considerations in the literature
outlined above. Yet, the observed differences in wage levels and wage dispersion are not
necessarily caused by the different bargaining regimes. First, they may conceal differences
in union power between different labor market segments. Second, they may result from
underlying heterogeneity in employee or firm characteristics. Both of these issues are
investigated by means of OLS and quantile wage regressions.
4.3 OLS Wage Regressions
We analyze the different channels of union impact on the wage level by means of wage
regressions with individual and firm–level controls. Log hourly wage Y are regressed on
the set of covariates X ≡ [Z, F, V ] including individual worker characteristics Z, firm
characteristics F , and a vector of union variables V . The estimates are based on a
sample of individuals i = 1, ..., N in firms c = 1, ..., C. Sampling weights account for
different sampling probabilities. Moreover, since our data are sampled with clustering
at the firm level and X contains information from different levels of aggregation, the
estimated covariance of the estimator βˆ has to account for clustering (Froot 1989, Moulton
1990, Williams 2000), i.e. standard errors should be consistent with respect to correlation
within firms.
The set of possible union variables V contains individual dummy variables for collective
contracts (CC) and firm–level contracts (FC), leaving individual contracts as the base cat-
egory; the shares of employees in each firm covered by a collective contract (SHARECC)
or a firm–level contract (SHAREFC); and net union density (NUD) at the cell level. Al-
lowing also for interaction effects between the variables from different levels, a benchmark
specification writes
Yic = β0 + ZicβZ + FcβF + CCicβV 1 + FCicβV 2 (1)
+SHARECCcβV 3 + SHAREFCcβV 4 +NUDicβV 5
+CCic · SHARECCcβV 6 + FCic · SHAREFCcβV 7
+CCic ·NUDicβV 8 + FCic ·NUDicβV 9
+SHARECCc ·NUDicβV 10 + SHAREFCc ·NUDicβV 11 + uic,
14More detailed evidence for wage distributions of different groups of employees (men, women working
full-time, and women working part-time, separate for blue-collar and white-collar workers in East and
West German firms) is provided in the companion paper Kohn and Lembcke (2007).
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where βV 1 to βV 5 measure base effects, βV 6 and βV 7 capture a different nature of individual
coverage in high-coverage firms as compared to low-coverage firms, and βV 8 and βV 9 allow
for the fact that union power may be targeted toward covered employees only. Positive
parameters βV 10 and βV 11 would indicate that strong unions achieve their wage objective
most successfully in high-coverage firms.
Table 4 displays results for different subsets of union variables, using our preferred
set of all individual and firm–level covariates.15 Specification (i), including only dummy
variables for individual coverage, yields significant but rather small effects with different
signs for collective and firm–level contracts. While employees subject to a collective
contract earn 0.9% less than employees with individual contracts, employees with a firm–
level contract earn 1.9% more. Results for the shares of covered employees in specification
(ii) are different, though. Here, both collective and firm–level contracts show a positive
and significant effect, which is in line with comparable firm–level studies reviewed in
section 3.3. An increase in the share of employees in a firm covered by a collective (firm–
level) contract by 10 percentage points (pp) is associated with a 0.34% (0.67%) increase in
wages. Individual coverage and firm–level shares are combined in specification (iii). While
the share variables have a pronounced positive effect, individual coverage by firm–level or
collective agreement shows negative ceteris paribus effects. It therefore proves important
to distinguish the effects of individual coverage and firm–level shares of covered employees.
The net effects for a covered individual in a firm with full coverage are negative.
Specification (iv) additionally allows for interaction effects, which turn out negative.
So individual coverage is particularly detrimental to the individual wage level in firms with
a high share of workers covered by a collective agreement. However, this does not hold for
firm–level agreements, as the effect of FC×SHAREFC is small and insignificant. Average
partial effects for individual coverage remain negative. For example, the marginal effect
for individual coverage by a collective contract, evaluated at the average coverage rate of
0.565, is –10.1%.16 So an employee in a firm with an average rate of collective coverage
ceteris paribus earns about 10% less than an uncovered employee in the same firm. In
turn, the marginal effect of an increase in the share of covered employees differs between
covered and uncovered employees. While both effects are positive, the effect for covered
employees is reduced by the interaction term. In combination, the marginal effect for
covered employees is a 0.8% wage increase for a 10 pp increase in the share of employees
covered by a collective contract, while the wage increase is 1.8% for uncovered employees.
15For a sensitivity analysis regarding the covariates see table 5 below.
16−0.048− 0.094 · 0.565 = −0.101. If not indicated otherwise, illustrative numbers for marginal effects
in the following are evaluated at the respective average coverage shares. When interpreting the results of
our preferred specification below we explicitly turn to average partial effects.
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Specifications (v) to (viii) introduce net union density into the regressions. In all spec-
ifications the base effect of net union density has a negative sign and is significant at the
1% level. Moreover, the inclusion of NUD does basically not alter the effects of bargaining
coverage. Only the coefficients of CC and FC become slightly more pronounced. Again,
we generally find a positive effect of collective coverage at the firm level, but negative
ceteris paribus effects of collective bargaining coverage for the individual. In specification
(v) the NUD effect takes up the effects of the omitted coverage variables. When coverage
effects are included in specification (vi), an increase in NUD of 10 pp is ceteris paribus as-
sociated with a decline in wages by about 1%. So either unions put only a small weight on
their wage-level objective, or they are not very effective in transforming their power into
a wage pay-off. Specification (vii), which additionally allows for interaction of union den-
sity and individual coverage, indicates a corresponding decline of about 3% for employees
with individual contracts. The positive interaction effects then imply a reduction of only
1% for employees covered by a collective contract, and even a slightly wage-increasing
effect of NUD in case of firm–level contracts. So stronger unions achieve higher wages for
covered employees only if the bargaining takes place at the firm level. Unions are least
effective with respect to—or put least emphasis on—the interests of uncovered employees.
The inclusion of interaction terms between NUD and the coverage shares in speci-
fication (viii) does not have additional explanatory power. It neither yields significant
coefficients, nor does it raise the R2. So we resort to specification (vii) as our preferred
specification for further analysis.
Column (c) of table 5 reproduces the results of the preferred specification. In the
lower panel of this table we further report average partial effects (APE).17 The num-
bers corroborate the above findings. On average, the partial effect of individual cover-
age is negative, while the firm–level shares of covered employees have a positive effect.
This finding would be in line with a risk premium paid to individuals who do not sub-
ject themselves to collective bargaining coverage.18 The APE of net union density is
also negative. This result is consistent with an insurance premium in accordance with
the insurance motive for union representation as discussed in the literature (Agell and
Lommerud 1992, Burda 1995, Fitzenberger and Kohn 2005). Alternatively, it would also
17The APE of, say, CC is calculated as ÂPE = βˆCC+βˆCC×SHARECC ·SHARECC+βˆNUD×CC ·NUD.
With demeaned variables, coefficients could directly be interpreted as average partial effects. However,
given our focus to disentangle the different impacts of, say, NUD for covered and for uncovered employees,
it is not reasonable to rely on APEs exclusively.
18Note that our estimations control for a large set of individual and firm characteristics, including,
i. a., firm-size and professional status (see table 1). Of course, we can not fully exclude the possibility of
selection effects based on unobserved differences within the categories of worker and firm characteristics.
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be consistent with the argument that firms in segments with strong unions ceteris paribus
invest less into capital—which in turn would reduce workers’ productivity and thus their
wages (Vogel 2007)—or with the notion that workers who are unemployed because of
higher wages in the covered sector put downward pressure on wages in the uncovered
sector.
In order to test the sensitivity of our preferred specification with respect to the set
of included covariates, table 5 uses our preferred set of union variables and displays the
results of specifications including
(a) no covariates.
(b) only worker characteristics such as human capital variables (educational attainment,
age, tenure) and workplace-related characteristics (region, indicators for shift-work
or work on Sundays, etc.).
(c) worker (see above) and firm characteristics such as size and industry of the firm or
average characteristics of the firm’s workforce.19
Controlling for individual-level and firm–level characteristics notably reduces the par-
tial effects of both collective coverage and net union density, and controls (in cross-
sectional wage regressions at least partially) for likely endogeneity issues in union density
and coverage. For example, the average partial effect of CC is –9% in specification (c),
while it would be –20% in specification (a). For covered employees, the partial effect of
SHARECC even changes sign—whereas a higher share of covered employees is associated
with a higher wage in specification (c), the effect would be negative in specification (a).
The effect of NUD also changes sign between specifications (b) and (c). The latter sug-
gests that the type of endogeneity of NUD differs regarding individual-level and firm–level
characteristics. Controlling for individual characteristics increases the estimated NUD co-
efficients. This result is consistent with NUD being negatively correlated with individual
characteristics that tend to be associated with higher wages. Unions tend to represent
workers with lower wages. In contrast, controlling for firm–level characteristics reduces
the estimated NUD coefficients. This result is consistent with NUD being positively
correlated with firm characteristics that tend to be associated with higher wages. The
motivation to unionize is larger when there exist rents which could be appropriated from
successful firms which tend to pay higher wages.
19This specification is the same as specification (vii) in table 4. Note that estimating the model with
firm-fixed effects is not feasible because the share variables, and in particular the coverage shares, do not
vary within a firm.
18
The findings of the sensitivity analysis highlight the importance of controlling for
individual as well as firm–level characteristics to account for these endogeneity issues.
The effects of both NUD and bargaining coverage on the level of wages are substantially
reduced if the full set of employer-employee information is controlled for. Therefore, for
the subsequent quantile regressions, we only report results controlling for both individual
and firm–level characteristics.
4.4 Quantile Regression Results
Least squares regressions focus on the wage level (average wage) only. Yet, union effects
may be expected to differ across the distribution, reflecting, e. g., union policies targeted
specifically towards low-wage earners. This would imply effects on wage dispersion. We
analyze differences across the conditional wage distribution by means of quantile regres-
sions, which were introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978). Analogously to the OLS
regressions in the preceding section, sampling weights are employed and inference has to
account for clustering. We show in appendix B how to estimate the asymptotic variance
V AR(βˆ(τ)) accounting for weights and cluster effects.20
Table 6 reports quantile regression results for our preferred specification. Again, the
upper panel reports regression coefficients and the lower panel the corresponding average
partial effects. In general, effects at the median are close to those obtained from least
squares estimation, and the estimated coefficients are significant.21
The effects of coverage shares at the firm level (both SHARECC and SHAREFC) do
not change much across the distribution. So a firm’s decision to apply a collective or a
firm–level contract increases wages across the entire distribution in a similar way. How-
ever, the negative impact of collective bargaining coverage for the individual is stronger
in upper parts of the conditional distribution. While the APE of a collective agreement
is –6% at the 10th percentile, it increases up to –12% at the 90th percentile. There-
fore, collective coverage at the individual level reduces wage inequality. The adoption of
a collective contract is in fact a means to reduce unjustified (as judged on the basis of
observable characteristics) pay gaps between employees, thereby encouraging solidarity
among the workforce. Since the coverage effect is also negative in the lower part of the
wage distribution, there is no evidence for a negative selection out of collective coverage
in this part of the distribution. The effect of firm–level agreements on individual wage
20So far, the approach is not standard in econometric software packages such as STATA, the package
employed in this paper. Bootstrapping as an alternative way to estimate V AR(βˆ(τ)) is not feasible due
to computational constraints at the Research Data Center.
21Only the interaction of FC and SHAREFC is insignificant at all quantiles, as in the OLS regression.
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dispersion is also negative, but not as pronounced as that of collective contracts.
The impact of union density also varies markedly across the wage distribution. The
negative base effect is strongest at the upper end of the distribution. Yet, the positive
interaction effects of NUD and the coverage regimes CC and FC also increase throughout
the distribution. Consequently, the differences in the impact of union power on covered
and uncovered employees are most severe at the upper end of the distribution. The APE
of NUD indicates that, on average, a 10 pp increase in union density comes along with
no significant effect at the 10th percentile, and with a significant reduction of 2.4% at the
90th percentile. So in fact, union power reduces wage inequality, which is in line with
the insurance motive of union representation discussed in the related literature. However,
our findings can not be solely attributed to the insurance motive because then one should
find positive wage effects in the lower part of the wage distribution even if the effect on
the mean is negative. The uniformly negative effect on wage levels at all quantiles first
suggests that negative spillover effects from wage increases and lower employment in the
covered sector to the non-covered sector dominate. The hypothesis of a union threat effect
is rejected on this ground. Second, firms in labor market segments with strong unions
ceteris paribus invest less into capital—which reduces labor productivity and wages across
the entire distribution (Vogel 2007). We can not discriminate between these two possible
explanations.
5 Conclusions
The design of the German wage-setting system suggests to distinguish explicitly between
union power as measured by union density and actual bargaining outcomes measured by
different regimes of collective bargaining coverage. Using data from the German Structure
of Earnings Survey (GSES) 2001, a newly available linked employer–employee data set,
we simultaneously analyze both channels of union impact on the structure of wages.
Employing OLS and quantile wage regressions, we find that the firm–level share of
employees subject to collective bargaining or firm–level agreements has a positive impact
on the average wage—firms which employ a collective contract on average pay higher
wages. As Card and de la Rica (2006) reckon, higher wages in firm–level contracts are
at least partially a non-competitive phenomenon. Yet, individual bargaining coverage
in a covered firm ceteris paribus shows a negative impact both on the wage level and
on wage dispersion. The negative impact of individual coverage is stronger at higher
quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. Collective bargaining coverage thus reduces
wage inequality. The findings are in line with the hypothesis that firms apply collective
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agreements in order to follow a transparent wage policy. However, a risk premium is paid
to workers in a covered firm who are not paid according to a collective contract, i. e.,
who are not covered individually. These workers tend to be the more successful workers
in the firm and tend not to be unionized. Their wages are determined by negotiations
of the individual worker with the firm. Wages of these workers are particularly high in
successful firms for which the coverage effect is also high since collective agreements can
extract higher rents from the firms.
Having controlled for the varieties of coverage considered, we also find significant
effects of net union density on the wage level and on wage dispersion. A higher share of
union members in a relevant labor market segment is ceteris paribus associated with lower
wages, and the effect is strongest among uncovered individuals and at the upper end of the
wage distribution. At the same time, a higher union density reinforces the positive wage
effects of coverage at the firm level. A higher union density also reduces wage dispersion.
This is in line with an insurance motive of union representation. However, the uniform
decline of wages in the uncovered sector across the entire wage distribution in response
to an increase in union density requires a further explanation. This finding may be due
to a decline of firms’ capital investment when union density increases (Vogel 2007) or to
downward pressure on wages because of the increase in labor supply in the uncovered
sector brought about by the higher wages in the covered sector. Our analysis does not
allow us to distinguish between these two hypotheses, which should be explored in future
research.
Our results highlight the importance of using linked employer–employee data in order
to control for worker as well as firm characteristics when evaluating union effects. Un-
fortunately, our estimations can not take account of the apparent endogeneity of union
density and collective coverage, and so the results should not be interpreted as causal
effects. The cross-sectional data do not provide adequate instruments for exclusion re-
strictions. Empirical evidence in the literature regarding the endogeneity of union status
variables is ambiguous; see Robinson (1989), Card (1996), and DiNardo and Lee (2004).
However, the endogeneity problem in our study is reduced by controlling for both in-
dividual and firm characteristics. Future research might explore further the interaction
of unions and collective bargaining with country-specific institutions (Addison, Teixeira,
and Zwick (2006), Hu¨bler and Jirjahn (2003), and Klikauer (2004)).
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A German Structure of Earnings Survey 2001
The German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES, Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung)
2001 is a linked employer–employee data set administered by the German Statistical Office
in accordance with European and German law (European Council Regulation (EC) No
530/1999, amended by EC 1916/2000; German Law on Wage Statistics, LohnStatG). It
is a sample of all firms in manufacturing and private service sectors with at least ten
employees. Sampling takes place at the firm or establishment level. At a first stage, firms
are randomly drawn from every Federal State, where the sampling probability varies
between 5.3% for the largest state (North Rhine-Westphalia) and 19.4% for the smallest
(Bremen). At the second stage, employees are randomly chosen from the firms sampled
at the first stage. The share of employees sampled depends upon the firm size and ranges
between 6.25% for the largest firms and 100% for firms with less than 20 employees. The
data set provides sampling weights.
The GSES 2001 is available for on-site use at Research Centers of the Federal States’
Statistical Offices (FDZ) since the year 2005. This study uses an anonymized use-file which
includes all firms and employees form the original data except for one firm in Berlin (the
only firm in Berlin falling into NACE section C). Regional information is condensed to
12 “states”, and some industries have been aggregated at the two-digit level. Overall, the
use-file consists of 22,040 sites with 846,156 sampled employees.
We focus on prime-age (25–55-year-old) male full-time employees in West Germany
(without Berlin), including both blue and white-collar workers. Employees in vocational
training, interns, and employees subject to partial retirement schemes are left out because
compensation for these groups does not follow the regular compensation schedule, but
special regulations or even special collective bargaining agreements do apply. We also
exclude white-collar workers in the highest professional status category (category 1) who
can reasonably be expected to pursue management objectives and whose wages are hardly
in the focus of collective wage setting. Individuals who worked less than 90% of their
contractual working hours in October 2001 and individuals paid subject to a collective
contract with a missing identification number for the agreement are dropped.
Part-time and full-time employees are distinguished based on the employer’s assess-
ment recorded in the GSES. For blue-collar workers, actual working time and not con-
tractual working time is relevant for monthly payments. We exclude individuals with an
actual working time of more than 390 hours in October 2001.
We analyze gross hourly wages including premia. This measure is more appropriate
than wages without premia if premia are paid on a regular basis. We impose a lower
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bound of one euro for hourly wages.
B Standard Errors for Quantile Regression with Sam-
pling Weights and Clustering
The asymptotic distribution of β(τ) for a given quantile τ in a non-iid setting is
√
N(βˆ(τ)− β(τ)) ∼ N(0, J(τ)−1Σ(τ)J(τ)−1) (2)
with
Σ(τ) ≡ E[(τ − 1{Y < X ′β(τ)})2XX ′] (3)
and
J(τ) ≡ E[fy(X ′β(τ)|X)XX ′] = E[fu(0|X)XX ′], (4)
assuming a correctly specified model (Angrist, Chernozhukov, and Ferna´ndez-Val 2006).
fu denotes the density of the error term; compare Hendricks and Koenker (1992), Koenker
(2005), and Melly (2006).
We estimate V AR(βˆ(τ)) by
̂V AR(βˆ(τ)) = 1
N
Jˆ(τ)−1Σˆ(τ)Jˆ(τ)−1 (5)
with
Σˆ(τ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(τ − 1{Yi < X ′iβˆ(τ)})2XiX ′i (6)
and
Jˆ(τ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
fˆiXiX
′
i (7)
for the case without weights and without clustering. We use the “Hendricks-Koenker
sandwich”
fˆi = 2hN/
(
X ′i(βˆ(τ + hN)− βˆ(τ − hN))
)
(8)
and employ Hall and Sheater’s (1988) rule for the bandwidth hN :
hN =
1
N1/3
z2/3α [1.5s(τ)/s
′′(τ)]1/3, (9)
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where zα satisfies Φ(zα) = 1− α/2 for the construction of 1− α confidence intervals and
s(τ) denotes the sparsity function.22 As in Koenker (1994), we use the normal distribution
to estimate
s(τ)/s′′(τ) =
f 2
2(f ′/f)2 + [(f ′/f)2 − f ′′/f ] =
φ(Φ(τ)−1)2
2(Φ(τ)−1)2 + 1
. (10)
In analogy to Angrist, Chernozhukov, and Ferna´ndez-Val (2004), we take account of
sampling weights by replacing (6) with
Σˆ(τ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
w2i (τ − 1{Yi < X ′iβˆ(τ)})2XiX ′i (11)
and (7) with
Jˆ(τ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
wifˆiXiX
′
i. (12)
Clustering allows for dependence of observations within clusters (see Froot (1989),
Moulton (1990), or Williams (2000) for the case of OLS). We take account of clustering
at the firm level and acknowledge that the sampling weights in the GSES are equal for
all individuals i = 1, ..., Nc within a cluster c. With sampling weights wc normalized to
sum to one,
∑C
c=1wc = 1, (11) and (12) generalize to
Σˆ(τ) =
1
N
C∑
c=1
w2c
Nc∑
i=1
Nc∑
j=1
Xic(τ − 1{Yic < X ′icβˆ(τ)})(τ − 1{Yjc < Xjcβˆ(τ)})X ′jc (13)
and
Jˆ(τ) =
1
N
C∑
c=1
wc
Nc∑
i=1
fˆicXicX
′
ic. (14)
22The sandwich formula is extensively described in Koenker (2005, pp. 79–80). Koenker also mentions
the “Powell sandwich”, which is employed by, e. g., Angrist, Chernozhukov, and Ferna´ndez-Val (2006).
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C Tables and Figures
Table 1: Definition of Variables
Label Description mean std. dev.
Individual Level
AGE Age in years/10. 3.963 0.799
AGESQ AGE squared. 16.34 6.441
TENURE Tenure in years/10. 0.924 0.923
TENURESQ TENURE squared. 1.705 2.716
LOW EDUC Low level of education: no training beyond a school degree
(or no school degree at all).
0.144 0.351
MED EDUC Intermediate level of education: vocational training. 0.679 0.467
HIGH EDUC High level of education: university or technical college degree. 0.108 0.311
NA EDUC Missing information on the level of education. 0.069 0.253
BC STAT1 Blue-collar worker, professional status category 1: vocation-
ally trained or comparably experienced worker with special
skills and highly involved tasks.
0.119 0.323
BC STAT2 Blue-collar worker, professional status category 2: vocation-
ally trained or comparably experienced worker.
0.225 0.418
BC STAT3 Blue-collar worker, professional status category 3: worker
trained on-the-job.
0.156 0.363
BC STAT4 Blue-collar worker, professional status category 4: laborer. 0.084 0.277
WC STAT2 White-collar worker, professional status category 2: executive
employee with limited procuration.
0.162 0.369
WC STAT3 White-collar worker, professional status category 3: employee
with special skills or experience who works on his own respon-
sibility on highly involved or complex tasks.
0.103 0.303
WC STAT4 White-collar worker, professional status category 4: vocation-
ally trained or comparably experienced employee who works
autonomously on involved tasks.
0.104 0.305
WC STAT5 White-collar worker, professional status category 5: vocation-
ally trained or comparably experienced employee working au-
tonomously.
0.040 0.196
WC STAT6 White-collar worker, professional status category 6: employee
working on simple tasks.
0.008 0.087
NIGHT Individual worked night shifts. 0.228 0.436
SUNDAY Individual worked on Sundays or on holidays. 0.153 0.391
SHIFT Individual worked shift. 0.147 0.354
OVERTIME Individual worked overtime. 0.264 0.441
Firm Level
S FEM Share of female employees. 0.325 0.241
S AGE1 Share of employees of age 20 or younger. 0.041 0.067
S AGE2 Share of employees of age 21–25. 0.078 0.075
S AGE3 Share of employees of age 26–30. 0.096 0.074
S AGE4 Share of employees of age 31–35. 0.145 0.082
S AGE5 Share of employees of age 36–40. 0.174 0.069
S AGE6 Share of employees of age 41–45. 0.143 0.076
S AGE7 Share of employees of age 46–50. 0.121 0.075
Continued on next page...
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... table 1 continued
Label Description mean std. dev.
S AGE8 Share of employees of age 51–55. 0.103 0.073
S AGE9 Share of employees of age 56–60. 0.068 0.063
S AGE10 Share of employees of age 61 or older. 0.042 0.056
S TENURE1 Share of employees with less than 1 year of tenure. 0.162 0.157
S TENURE2 Share of employees with 1–2 years of tenure. 0.205 0.150
S TENURE3 Share of employees with 3–5 years of tenure. 0.150 0.125
S TENURE4 Share of employees with 6–10 years of tenure. 0.168 0.120
S TENURE5 Share of employees with 11–15 years of tenure. 0.117 0.097
S TENURE6 Share of employees with 16–20 years of tenure. 0.064 0.072
S TENURE7 Share of employees with 21–25 years of tenure. 0.055 0.068
S TENURE8 Share of employees with 26–30 years of tenure. 0.039 0.059
S TENURE9 Share of employees with 31 or more years of tenure. 0.038 0.062
S LOW EDUC Share of employees with LOW EDUC. 0.198 0.194
S MED EDUC Share of employees with MED EDUC. 0.639 0.227
S HIGH EDUC Share of employees with HIGH EDUC. 0.072 0.136
S NA EDUC Share of employees with NA EDUC. 0.113 0.229
HOURSWORKED Average hours worked in the firm. 154.2 23.7
S IRREG Share of employees for whom any of NIGHT, SUNDAY, or
SHIFT applies.
0.178 0.232
S OVERTIME Share of employees working overtime. 0.178 0.260
S BC Share of blue collar workers. 0.478 0.327
S NOT FT Share of employees who do not work full-time. 0.224 0.212
FIRMSIZE1 Firm has between 10 and 49 employees. 0.416 0.493
FIRMSIZE2 Firm has between 50 and 249 employees. 0.350 0.477
FIRMSIZE3 Firm has between 250 and 499 employees. 0.109 0.312
FIRMSIZE4 Firm has between 500 and 999 employees. 0.073 0.260
FIRMSIZE5 Firm has between 1000 and 1999 employees. 0.040 0.195
FIRMSIZE6 Firm has 2000 or more employees. 0.020 0.140
SECTOR1 Mining and quarrying (NACE: 10–14) 0.011 0.105
SECTOR2 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco
(NACE: 15–16)
0.034 0.181
SECTOR3 Manufacture of textiles and textile products; leather and
leather products (NACE: 17–19)
0.019 0.138
SECTOR4 Manufacture of wood and wood products; pulp, paper and
paper products (NACE: 20–21)
0.033 0.179
SECTOR5 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
(NACE: 22)
0.036 0.186
SECTOR6 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear
fuel; chemicals and chemical products (NACE: 23–24)
0.027 0.162
SECTOR7 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products (NACE: 25) 0.033 0.178
SECTOR8 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products (NACE:
26)
0.028 0.164
SECTOR9 Manufacture of basic metals; fabricated metal products, ex-
cept from machinery and equipment (NACE: 27–28)
0.055 0.229
SECTOR10 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. (NACE: 29) 0.045 0.207
SECTOR11 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
(NACE: 31)
0.025 0.157
SECTOR12 Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment; radio, televi-
sion, and communication equipment and apparatus (NACE:
30 + 32)
0.021 0.144
Continued on next page...
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... table 1 continued
Label Description mean std. dev.
SECTOR13 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments,
watches and clocks (NACE: 33)
0.023 0.149
SECTOR14 Manufacture of transport equipment (NACE: 34–35) 0.032 0.176
SECTOR15 Manufacture n.e.c. (NACE: 36–37) 0.024 0.154
SECTOR16 Electricity, gas and water supply (NACE: 40–41) 0.025 0.155
SECTOR17 Construction (NACE: 45) 0.082 0.274
SECTOR18 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcy-
cles; retail sale of automotive fuel (NACE: 50)
0.031 0.173
SECTOR19 Wholesale trade and commission trade except of motor vehi-
cles and motorcycles (NACE: 51)
0.056 0.231
SECTOR20 Retail trade, except from motor vehicles and motorcycles;
repair of personal and household goods (NACE: 52)
0.050 0.219
SECTOR21 Hotels and restaurants (NACE: 55) 0.027 0.161
SECTOR22 Land transport; transport via pipelines; air transport
(NACE: 60 + 62)
0.028 0.165
SECTOR23 Water transport (NACE: 61) 0.008 0.088
SECTOR24 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of
travel agencies (NACE: 63)
0.044 0.204
SECTOR25 Post and telecommunications (NACE: 64) 0.023 0.150
SECTOR26 Financial intermediation, except from insurance and pension
funding; activities auxiliary to financial intermediation, ex-
cept from insurance and pension funding (NACE: 65 + 67.1)
0.022 0.148
SECTOR27 Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social se-
curity; activities auxiliary to insurance and pension funding
(NACE: 66 + 67.2)
0.016 0.126
SECTOR28 Real estate activities; renting of machinery and equipment
without operator and of personal and household goods
(NACE: 70–71)
0.015 0.123
SECTOR29 Computer and related activities (NACE: 72) 0.022 0.146
SECTOR30 Research and development; other business activities (NACE:
73–74)
0.075 0.264
PUBLIC1 Firm is privately owned. 0.923 0.267
PUBLIC2 Firm is partly public-owned (<50%). 0.021 0.144
PUBLIC3 Firm is mainly public-owned (>50%). 0.056 0.230
REGION1 Firm is located in Schleswig-Holstein or Hamburg. 0.106 0.308
REGION2 Firm is located in Lower Saxony or Bremen. 0.158 0.365
REGION3 Firm is located in North Rhine-Westphalia. 0.203 0.402
REGION4 Firm is located in Hesse. 0.105 0.306
REGION5 Firm is located in Rhineland-Palatinate or Saarland. 0.104 0.305
REGION6 Firm is located in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg. 0.158 0.365
REGION7 Firm is located in Bavaria. 0.166 0.372
Data source: Extended GSES 2001.
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Table 2: Wage Setting Regimes and Wages
regime coverage log hourly wages
share mean min max std. dev.
collective coverage (CC) 0.565 2.810 0.056 4.700 0.286
firm–level coverage (FC) 0.075 2.833 1.434 4.754 0.314
individual coverage (IC) 0.360 2.786 0.046 5.097 0.420
total 2.804 0.046 5.097 0.343
N 316,805
Log hourly wages (in Euros). Data source: Extended GSES 2001.
Figure 1: Bargaining Coverage Within Firms
0
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Histogram: Share of employees covered by collective or firm–level contracts as fraction of firm’s total
employment. Data source: Extended GSES 2001.
Table 3: Net Union Density
mean min max std. dev. #
Cells 0.188 0 0.500 0.101 5,841
Employees 0.228 0 0.500 0.102 316,805
Data source: Extended GSES 2001.
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Table 5: Wage Regressions II: Different Sets of Covariates
(a) (b) (c)≡(vii)
coef. std. dev. coef. std. dev. coef. std. dev.
CC 0.030 (0.033) -0.057∗∗ (0.018) -0.082∗∗ (0.012)
FC -0.169∗ (0.074) -0.121∗∗ (0.045) -0.149∗∗ (0.033)
SHARECC 0.708∗∗ (0.015) 0.227∗∗ (0.009) 0.171∗∗ (0.008)
SHAREFC 0.644∗∗ (0.033) 0.185∗∗ (0.020) 0.165∗∗ (0.018)
SHARECC×CC -0.781∗∗ (0.043) -0.160∗∗ (0.018) -0.096∗∗ (0.015)
SHAREFC×FC -0.454∗∗ (0.073) -0.075 (0.047) -0.031 (0.043)
NUD -0.783∗∗ (0.057) 0.213∗∗ (0.040) -0.296∗∗ (0.055)
NUD×CC 0.812∗∗ (0.071) 0.296∗∗ (0.059) 0.203∗∗ (0.032)
NUD×FC 0.783∗∗ (0.171) 0.453∗∗ (0.118) 0.367∗∗ (0.068)
Controls
individual characteristics no yes yes
firm–level characteristics no no yes
R2 0.143 0.660 0.710
N 316,805 316,805 316,805
Average Partial Effects
CC -0.200∗∗ (0.009) -0.075∗∗ (0.006) -0.087∗∗ (0.005)
FC -0.025 (0.052) -0.025 (0.030) -0.068∗ (0.028)
SHARECC 0.266∗∗ (0.018) 0.137∗∗ (0.009) 0.117∗∗ (0.009)
SHAREFC 0.610∗∗ (0.033) 0.179∗∗ (0.019) 0.162∗∗ (0.016)
NUD -0.265∗∗ (0.038) 0.414∗∗ (0.045) -0.154∗∗ (0.048)
Regressions by OLS, observations weighted by inverse sampling probabilities. Upper panel: regression
coefficients. Lower panel: corresponding average partial effects. Clustered standard errors in
parentheses. ∗/ ∗∗: significance at the 5% / 1% level. Data source: Extended GSES 2001.
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